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Once upon a time, there was a wonderful country where politicians
cooperated across the aisle. Under what was known as the Fixed Point Pact, the
country's center-left party and center-right party worked seamlessly together for
40 years, alternating regularly between presidential power and loyal opposition.
The center-right was friendlier with big business, and the center-left with big
labor. Yet policymaking was rather stable no matter which side was in power,
since the winner of each election was pledged to establish a national unity
cabinet representing both parties and was bound to a set of shared policy
principles. In 1995, two leading political scientists categorized countries in Latin
America as having institutionalized, transitioning, or inchoate party systems. The
political scientists lauded this country"s system as being the most
institutionalized, marked by "stability in interparty competition, the existence of
parties that have somewhat stable roots in society, acceptance of parties and
elections as the legitimate institutions that determine who governs, and party
organizations with reasonably stable rules and structures."' Three years later in
1998, Hugo Chdvez became President of Venezuela, and those "reasonably stable
rules and structures" came tumbling down. Venezuela's two traditional parties
now have no representatives in the legislature, which recently granted Chdivez the
2power to rule by decree for 18 months.
The political stability of Venezuela's Fixed Point Pact was a mirage in the
long term, because it was built on collusion rather than competition. George
Stigler, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1982 in large part for
articulating the related concept of state capture, quipped that the plural of
anecdote is data. With Stigler's implicit permission, I offer several anecdotes
from Latin America to argue that collusion is the most harmful aspect of
corruption, since its purpose is to defeat a fundamental prerequisite for
development: competition. Competition drives economic growth, and economic
growth drives economic development. So if we care about development, we must
care about collusion. Part II of this paper defines collusion and explains why it
can be combated effectively only with market-based mechanisms. Part III
* Senior Advisor for Inward Investment Policy and Security, U.S. Treasury Department. The views
represented in this article are that of the author, and have not been reviewed by the Treasury.
1. SCOTT MAINWARING & TIMOTHY R. SCULLY, BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: PARTY
SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA (Stanford University Press: 1995).
2. BBC News, Rule by Decree Passed for Chavez (Jan. 19, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/
6277379.stm.
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analyzes what this means for the three pillars of Gleneagles-style development
policy: debt, aid, and trade.
II. COLLUSION AND COMPETITION
A. Defining Collusion
Collusion is cooperation between two parties that should instead be
competing, or at least maintaining an arm's length. By cooperating, they seek to
divvy up benefits between them, excluding other parties that might otherwise
claim some of the benefits. In 1982, Robert Crandall, then-CEO of American
Airlines, faced price-fixing charges by proposing to his counterpart at Braniff,
"Raise your [expletive deleted] fares 20%. I'll raise mine the next morning...
You'll make more money, and I will, too."3 When two business competitors
collude, their customers lose. The colluders may reap a higher profit margin and
apparent market stability, but over time they do their jobs less efficiently and the
economy as a whole will suffer.
A similar result can be seen with political collusion. In the case of
Venezuela's Fixed Point Pact, the colluders were two political parties. By
working out a long-term deal, they denied voters an authentic choice between
competing ideologies and froze out other would-be leaders. Without truly
competitive pressures, Venezuelan politics became a game of inside baseball,
rather than representative democracy-and the stability brought by the pact
became increasingly fragile. Chavez first tried to push his way in by attempting a
military coup in 1992, and succeeded democratically in 1998 once the pact was
sufficiently discredited.4 Political collusion can also occur between politicians
and private interests. In that case, collusion diverts political benefits from the
public good to private pocketbooks or resumes.
Collusion is one of the two central aspects of corruption, the other being
transfer of a bribe. In 2006, the International Financial Institutions Anti-
Corruption Task Force proposed a harmonized approach to combating corrupt,
fraudulent, coercive, and collusive practices in the operations of the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and five regional development banks.' The
task force defined corruption as "offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly
or indirectly, anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another
party" and defined collusion as "an arrangement between two or more parties
designed to achieve an improper purpose, including influencing improperly the
3. John S. Demott, Dirty Tricks in Dallas, TIME (Mar. 7, 1983) available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,953755-1,00.html.
4. Damarys Canache, From Bullets to Ballots: The Emergence of Popular Support for Hugo Chavez in
LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY (Spring 2002).
5. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, OFFICE OF INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY: ANNUAL REPORT
(2006), available at http://www.iadb.org/integrity/oii-arO6/leadership.cfm?language=en&parid=8.
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actions of another party."6 An act can be corrupt without involving collusion, if
one party rejects the overture of the other, but all successful bribery involves
collusion. In turn, collusion does not require a quantifiable bribe to change hands,
though it always excludes another party from at least potential benefits.
B. The Importance of Collusion
Collusion is the most harmful aspect of corruption. Much public attention is
paid to corruption's other major aspect: illicit value transfer. Fiscal losses from
official fraud and public officials' solicitation of their "cut" impoverish govern-
ment programs, some of which would otherwise make a greater contribution to
development. The resulting loss is very real and can sometimes be in part
dynamic.7 For example, if the extra cost of a bribe cannot be passed on, a
company may be dissuaded from even bidding on a privatization - robbing the
economy of the additional investment and competition the company may have
brought. However, the loss caused by the value-transfer aspect of corruption is in
large part static.
In contrast, the loss from collusion is principally dynamic. Collusion between
government officials and the winning bidder in a privatization may unnecessarily
extend the term of the bidder's monopoly rights, for example, resulting in a less
efficient privatized sector and less economic growth. In one way or another,
collusion is the opposite of competition. Collusion is often between parties that
should be competing directly. In other cases, a government official may limit the
competition faced by the private interest with whom he colludes. Competition, by
driving innovation and efficiency, is the principal source of dynamic economic
gains. Thus, by undermining competition, collusion causes dynamic economic
losses.
Development requires economic growth, and rapid economic growth rests on
dynamic gains. For example, in the trade liberalization context, potential
dynamic gains (e.g., local firms becoming more efficient in order to compete) far
exceed potential static gains (e.g., a foreign firm offering a product at a lower
price).' The same is true for losses. Thus, for development purposes, collusion iswhat hurts most about corruption.
6. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK FORCE, UNIFORM FRAMEWORK
FOR PREVENTING AND COMBATING FRAUD AND CORRUPTION (Sept. 2006) available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTDOll/Resources/FinallFITaskForceFramework&Gdlines.pdf.
7. Dynamic gains and losses are caused over time by a factor that changes the rate of growth of
productivity, whereas static gains and losses are triggered by a factor that changes the level of productivity.
8. See, e.g., Anderson et al, infra note 36 (estimating global gains from full liberalization of trade of
goods by 2015 at $287 billion using static measurement and $461 billion using dynamic measurement).
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C. (Collusive) Redistribution versus (Competitive) Production
Collusion between Venezuela's two traditional parties-the center-right
Christian Democrats (COPEI) and the center-left Democratic Action (AD)-was
encouraged by the so-called "curse" 9 of natural resources. American oil
companies discovered heavy crude in Venezuela's Maracaibo Bay in the 1920s,
giving birth to an off-and-on oil boom. In 1976, President Carlos Andrfs Pfrez of
AD nationalized the Venezuelan oil industry. Chdivez is using the state-owned oil
company, Petr6leos de Venezuela (PDVSA), to finance his social revolution both
domestically and regionally, while cutting back on investment in the firm's
operations. Part of PDVSA's ultimate purpose, according to its website, is to
"provide a dignified and beneficial existence for the Venezuelan people, owners
of the national subsoil riches. . ."' In a 2006 survey by Venezuela's leading
pollster, 62% of Venezuelans categorized their country as "extremely rich," with
very few saying it is "neither rich nor poor" (7%), "rather poor" (9%), or "very
poor" (4%)."
This belief in natural abundance is mistaken: the first rule of economics is
that resources are scarce. Thus, welfare ultimately depends not upon natural
endowments, but upon ongoing production. The belief in natural abundance also
encourages collusion. If there is a large enough national piggybank, then it is
unnecessary to maximize production through competition (with all of its ugly
disadvantages), and better to focus on how to share the riches among key players.
For example, the scale of privatizations in Venezuela was less than in most other
Latin countries,' 2 even before Chdvez increased the role of the state in the
economy and reversed several privatizations.
In a fantasy world of abundance, the goal becomes a fair distribution of
existing wealth-but the reality is that collusion is decisive in determining how
the pot is divvied up. Before Chdvez, the two traditional parties ensured a modest
redistribution of populist goodies to the plebes, while traditional elites with
powerful connections perpetuated the country's inequalities, typical of the entire
region. ChAvez gained power in reaction to this system, but rather than stopping
the collusion, he has exacerbated it. Even without the constitutional amendments
9. RICHARD M. AUTY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES: THE RESOURCE CURSE
THESIS (Routledge 1993) (coining the term "resource curse"); Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural
Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5398
(1995).
10. Petr6leos de Venezuela, S.A., available at http://www.pdvsa.com/ (quoted under Acerca de
PDVSA).
11. Alfredo Keller & Associates, http://www.alfredokeller.com (e-mail confirmation of poll results from
Alfredo Keller on file with author).
12. See Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Country Analysis Brief,-
Venezuela (Oct. 2007) (stating that state-owned oil company, PDVSA, accounts for a third of Venezuelan
GDP); see also EIA Report on Venezuela ("Although Venezuela's privatization efforts have lagged those of
other Latin American countries, PDVSA has long been an internationally oriented petroleum company"),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/pgemch3c.html.
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narrowly voted down in December 2007, Chivez has unitary control over all
national government authority in Venezuela, and government authority
increasingly constrains Venezuelans' private economic and press freedoms.
Subsidies, as well as currency and price controls, create massive distortions - and
opportunities for arbitrage and corruption. Being "in" with the government is
now more critical than ever to one's lot in life. For example, thousands of
PDVSA employees who signed the petition supporting the 2004 recall vote
against Chdvez were fired soon afterward and replaced with loyal apparatchiks
far less knowledgeable about the oil industry. In a speech to employees in 2006,
PDVSA's president said, "Here, we are backing Chdvez... Those who do not
feel comfortable with that orientation should give their jobs to" a Chdvez
supporter."' 3 Collusion sinks its roots deeper, market forces weaken, production
suffers, and development opportunities escape.
D. (Collusive) Personal Relationships versus (Competitive) Rule of Law
Peru also has a history of shameless collusion between political leaders and
entrenched private interests, as well as collusion within the business community.
Society-including both politics and business-requires a modicum of trust in
others' actions. In mature free markets and democracies, the rule of law allows
for that requisite level of trust by enforcing basic rules which we can assume
everyone will follow (or be adequately penalized for not following). Where rule
of law is weak, the trust that derives from personal relationships replaces fair,
arms-length dealings. This certainly describes traditional Peru, though there have
been improvements in the rule of law in the last decade. People cooperate with
those in their circle to maintain their reputation, honor, and mutually assured
advantage within the circle. Thus, traditional "Peruvian society" was, in fact, not
so much one society as groupings of separate, very small societies, held together
by personal relationships. Among those very small societies, a very, very small
elite society dominated both national politics and big business. From those elite
came presidents whose entourages included advisors who made their livings from
collusion with the private interests from which they had come and to whom they
would return, as well as private-sector "friends of the President" who had license
to engage in economic rent-seeking from inauguration to inauguration.
Then along came "El Chino"-Alberto Fujimori, who was surprisingly
elected President of Peru in 1990. Fujimori was a true outsider: non-white,
unpolished, middle-class; a second-generation Peruvian whose name elite society
13. See Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (STRATFOR), Venezuela: Oil Workers Being Fired? (Apr. 5, 2006)
(subscription required); Trade Union Reports Dismissals in Foreign Oil Finns Taken by PDVSA, EL UNIVERSAL (Apr.
4, 2006) (suggesting that anyone who signed petition for recall referendum against Chavez in 2004 is now barred from
PDVSA); BBC News, Storm Over Venezuela Oil Speech (Nov. 4, 2006) (stating that 18,000 PDVSA workers were
fired in 2003 after PDVSA's strike to oppose Chavez policies, as well as that Chvez defended speech by PDVSA
President Ramirez, saying it should be repeated "100 times a day").
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barely recognized until weeks before his election. Fujimori initially appeared
beholden to no one, with a maniacal, controlling, and scientific focus on
governing the ungovernable. He fired top advisors at the drop of a hat, including
his own brother, and eventually installed his daughter as First Lady after
throwing his wife out of the presidential palace for opposing some of his
policies. 4 He was a force of nature-and nature proved no match for him. For
centuries, El Niio currents have caused deadly and economically devastating
floods on Peru's coast. While previous presidents had done little but pound their
chests for the dead, Fujimori, an engineer, planned ahead for the 1998 occurrence
with $500 million in public works. Those El Nifio weather patterns were the
worst in 50 years, so his preparations proved inadequate. But Fujimori received
credit from many voters for making a serious stand against the elements, as well
as for his hands-on approach to crisis management once the floods came. This
only reinforced Fujimori's maniacal certainty that he alone knew how to govern
Peru. He was a detail-oriented autocrat, not a get-along-come-along team player.
The cozy, collusive relationships Peru was accustomed to were in danger.
Fujimori's reign unleashed a torrent of changes, many of which were
unsettling to the traditional vested interests. Shock therapy threw open to market
forces the prices of most goods. Mass privatizations attracted international capital
that promptly began competing with local business in additional sectors.
Fujimori's dissolution of the legislature and rule by decree for several months in
1992 deposed the entrenched, traditional political class and replaced many of
their collusion-friendly laws with modern, market-friendly laws straight from the
Washington Consensus. 6 Tax reform cut the number of taxes by over one
hundred, reducing administration and compliance (previously, evasion) costs
while increasing collections. Fujimori gave a large economic reform portfolio to
Hernando de Soto, whose 1986 book The Other Path had brought international
14. See generally RICHARD BAUER & SALLY BOWEN, THE FUJIMORI FILE: PERU AND ITS PRESIDENT
1990-2000 (Peru Monitor 2000).
15. See Fujimori Against El Nino, ECONOMIST (Sept. 27, 1997) available at http://www.highbeam.
com/doc/1Gl-19797234.html (subscription required) (crediting Fujimori for planning ahead with massive
public works to detain weather disruptions forecasted to be far worse than the 1982-83 El Nino); see also
Anthony Faiola, In Peru It's President Fujimori vs. El Nino, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (Feb. 22, 1998) available at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-4434091.html (subscription required) (describing Fujimori shouting orders
at work site, dressed in blue jeans and Caterpillar work boots); but see El Dedo de la Falla, CARETAS, available
at http://www.caretas.com.pe/1998/1509/dedo/dedo.htm (tallying fatalities from El Nino at 296 and claiming
that Fujimori's preparations were ill-designed).
16. See Augusto Alvarez Rodrich & Gabriel Ortiz de Zevallos, eds., IMPLEMENTACION DE POLITICAS
POBLICAS EN EL PERO [Implementation of Public Politics in Peru] (Apoyo Comunicaciones 1995) (surveying
reforms in Fujimori's first term); JOHN CRABTREE & JIM THOMAS, FUJIMORI'S PERU: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY (Institute of Latin American Studies 1998) see also J. Welby Leaman, Taxes and Transaction Costs:
Peruvian Tax Reform as a Method of Microenterprise Development (contrasting tax law before and after
Fujimori's 1992-93 reforms), in Beatriz Boza, ed., PERU: BEYOND THE REFORMS (PromPerd and Universidad
del Pacffico 1997), at 289, 294; cf. John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN
AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS HAPPENED? (John Williamson, ed. 1990) (defining elements of
Washington Consensus).
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attention to Latin America's stultifying and collusion-inducing over-bureaucra-
tization. With consultation and funding from the World Bank, Fujimori also
established the Fund for Social Compensation and Development (FONCODES),
presided over by a squeaky-clean development expert. FONCODES directed
development assistance and awarded contracts using a scientific system to
pinpoint poverty and microenterprise development needs, rather than the
traditional system of walking-around money for loyal politicians and contracts
for friendly businesses. 17
Perhaps most importantly, Fujimori introduced Peru's first competition policy,
including state-of-the-art anti-monopoly and consumer protection laws. The
National Institute for Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual
Property (INDECOPI), the independent regulatory agency charged with enforcing
the new laws, shook the collusive foundations of Peru's business community and
served as a model for free-market regulation throughout the region.18 When bread
prices spiked soon before the State of the Union speech in 1995, Fujimori's first
instincts were to announce price controls. But INDECOPI's president, Beatriz
Boza, demonstrated that bread prices were artificially high because of collusion
among wheat producers. Fujimori held off announcing price controls, INDECOPI
broke collusion in the market, and competition policy had a solid ally in the
presidential palace from then on.,9
That support held even when INDECOPI fined a leading Japanese-Peruvian
over $1 million for collusion in the poultry industry. That businessman's line of
defense showed how foreign the concept of competition was, and how reasonable
collusion seemed: He made clear that he worked hard to remain first in the
sector, but argued that INDECOPI was forcing him to be a bad Catholic. Why
should he try to put his weaker "neighbors" out of business when, by cooperating
on price, he could ensure that they, too, could afford to send their children to
17. A Valuable Experience: FONCODES 1995-98, in FRANCISCO SAGASTI & AGENDA PERU,
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES FOR THE 21" CENTURY: THE CASE OF PERU (International Development Research
Centre 2000), at 132 (highlighting Alejandro Afuso's tenure as rigorously focused on development results),
available at http://www.agendaperu.org.pe/pdfs/inf-ing-02.pdf; see also Fondu de Compensaci6n Social y
Desarrollo, http://www.foncodes.gob.pe/ (describing FONCODES' stated objective of generating employment,
alleviating poverty, and improving access to social services).
18. See generally THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN COMPETITION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY IN
LATIN AMERICA: TOWARDS AN ACADEMIC AUDIT OF INDECOPI (PromPerd, INDECOPI, Maxwell School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, and Universidad del Pacffico 2000) and Beatriz Boza,
ed., PERU'S EXPERIENCE IN MARKET REGULATORY REFORM: LESSONS FROM THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF
INDECOPI, 1993-1998 (Indecopi 1998) (providing internal descriptions of INDECOPI accomplishments and
independent analysis of INDECOPI's leadership in international best practices, for example, "'Indecopi is a
passionate concept, a new idea.., that overcomes many traditional ways of doing things'-Douglass C. North,
1993 Nobel Laureate in Economics"); and Carlos A. Patr6n, Building Competitive Markets in Peru: The Case
for Indecopi (unpublished University of Oxford thesis 2001).
19. BEATRIZ BOZA AND INSTITUTO APoYO, TAILOR-MADE COMPETITION POLICY IN A STANDARDIZING
WORLD: A STUDY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 33 (International Development
Research Centre 2005)(describing INDECOPI's wheat flour case), available at http://idrinfo.idrc.ca/archive/
corpdocs/121364/121364.txt.
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good schools? 20 Lost in that collusive logic were the businessman's other
"neighbors"-consumers. Most of their children did not go to prep school with
the businessman's children, so in Peru's traditional business culture, he did not
recognize them as his "neighbors." But under Peru's new free-market rule of law,
he owed them competitively set prices-and was now required to satisfy that
obligation. Encouraged by an outsider President and new laws with international
support, the free-market forces of competition were beginning to weaken the
collusive power of personal relationships.
E. Conductivity of Collusion
Fujimori's background, personality, and some of his policy positions made
him a good candidate to break collusion's back. Yet Fujimori's story did not end
in anti-corruption bliss. Though he undoubtedly would have preferred to be an
island unto himself, Fujimori turned out to need the cooperation of the military,
the press, legislators, judges, and other key constituencies, in order to maintain
his autocratic style in Peru's democratic system. This was particularly true during
the several months that he ruled by decree after dissolving the legislature in 1992,
as well as during his legally questionable campaign for a third term in 2000.
Fujimori bought the cooperation he needed by spreading around millions in
bribes from a slush fund maintained by his spy chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, and
turning a blind eye to Montesinos' collusive relationship with certain
businessmen and judges. During the 2000 election campaign, the owner of Peru's
leading television station purportedly received $1.5 million per month for
favorable coverage and Montesinos' right to veto certain shows and to terminate
the employment of journalists he did not trust. Down-market yellow journalists
21got paid by the story. When the election looked particularly difficult and the
respected chief of FONCODES refused to revise his computer model to send
some extra aid to parts of the country where the President needed votes, Fujimori
forced him out.
22
Fujimori may have stolen tens of millions of dollars in state funds for
himself. Yet television crews that entered the Presidential Palace immediately
after Fujimori faxed his resignation from Japan found slovenly living quarters in
which the President did his own (hardly gourmet) cooking.23 Fujimori's
corruption appears not to have been so much about personal financial enrichment
as about financing his way into prolonged power. Even this outsider, too self-
20. Id. at 48 (describing INDECOPI's poultry case).
21. John McMillan & Pablo Zoido, How to Subvert Democracy: Montestinos in Peru (Apr. 21, 2004) at
6-8, 14-15, available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/3823/Montesinos_0421 .pdf
22. See Del Mazo Su Duro, CARETAS (July 14, 1998) (stating that Afuso resigned when Fujimori
advisor Absal6n Vsquez sought campaign assistance from FONCODES).
23. Cf, Anthony Faiola, A Wounded Samurai on the Run, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2000, at A19 (de-
scribing allegations of illicit funds transfer; describing Fujimori's final image as desperate man on the run, with
belongings being hauled away from Presidential palace after his resignation).
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confident and impatient to cooperate with the old colluders, succumbed to
collusion as the price for necessary cooperation from parties that Fujimori needed
in order to govern "on his own." Even in a partial democracy, collusion cannot
easily be defeated by giving significant powers to someone personally
uninterested in corruption, unless he quickly develops authentic democratic
support for his possession of those powers. Otherwise, the exigencies of
governance will require even an anti-colluder to choose between colluding, and
being shown the exit before he can complete his work.
Collusion is infectious. Personal, business, and official relationships-
necessary for commerce and economic growth-spread the effects of collusion
from one party to the next. Officials charged with combating collusion may be
honest, but their actions are nonetheless often distorted by others' collusion. A
recent Peruvian judicial reform project sponsored by a major international
organization (not the one for which I worked) serves as an unfortunate example.
Peru's judiciary is very corrupt and was especially so under Fujimori. In 2000
and 2004 surveys by the leading Peruvian polling firm, Peruvians ranked the
judiciary dead last when asked which major national organizations they trusted.24
As a result, several big donor organizations were keen to help reform Peru's
judiciary during the Toledo administration. One, however, encountered
significant reticence from its potential counterparts in the judiciary. A high
official in the judiciary noted that he would be more likely to cooperate with the
organization if its program in Peru were directed by an individual he felt
especially comfortable with. Desperate to ensure that its program moved forward
with good counterpart cooperation, the international organization promptly hired
the "recommended" individual at a salary far above Peruvian private sector rates.
Thereby, the management of a major anti-corruption program appears to have
been indirectly controlled by the very same... corruption that was being
25targeted by the program.
In contrast, the Inter-American Development Bank' (IDB)'s judicial reform
project in Peru tried to cut off the conduction of collusion by tying its aid to
unbending rules. IDB funding put judges, prosecutors, and public defenders
together under one roof, in order to provide judicial services more seamlessly.
The IDB realized, though, that the computer assigned to each of these one-stop
judicial units was likely to "disappear," undermining the unit's efficiency. So the
IDB required that each computer not be removed from the judge's desk. As a
result, many computers sit unused or underused in front of judges who either
26refuse to, or do not know how, to use them. In other words, one donor
24. Apoyo Comunicaciones 2004, cited in BOZA, supra note 19, at 36 (also citing Latinobarometer 2001
poll showing that 17 percent of Peruvians have faith in their country's judiciary, compared with 36 percent of
Chileans).
25. Interview granted on condition of anonymity with one of the direct participants in the arrangement
described, in Lima, Peru (July 2003).
26. Interview with Katherine Muller, Team Leader of IRIS Center Judicial Reform Project, in Lima,
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organization paid collusion its due in hopes of winning the judiciary's
cooperation, while another donor organization took a hard line against corruption
but saw the effectiveness of its program suffer as a result. It is difficult to tackle
collusion without it tackling you, one way or another.
F. The Search for a Prime Mover
To break the potentially infinite chain of collusive interactions, we must
anchor our anti-collusion efforts in a "prime mover" that does not collude. In his
Metaphysics, Aristotle posited that motion must have originated from a fixed
point-the "prime mover"-from which the first moving object pushed off,
starting the universe's endless chain of action and reaction.2' There is only one
potential prime mover free of collusion, and that is the free market-because the
force that stabilizes it is competition, the opposite of collusion.
Our best opportunity to attack corruption is to promote a free market and to
fashion market-based anti-corruption mechanisms, so that competitive forces
bind the hands of would-be colluders. International trade liberalization provides a
clear example of this binding effect. Local business leaders may prefer to collude
among themselves and with captured government officials and agencies, but the
entry of foreign businesses selling at competitive prices requires the locals to
compete not only with the foreigners, but with each other-or risk losing their
market.
The fact that we must tackle collusion by promoting competition should not
be surprising-and may seem nothing more than circular-since collusion and
competition are opposites. Yet few would instinctively have taken issue with the
international development organization described above when it tried to gain the
Peruvian judiciary's cooperation in order to tackle judicial corruption.
Competition is the often-unnoticed alternative. INDECOPI, Peru's competition
agency, competed with Peru's judiciary on resolution of competition and
intellectual property disputes. Its administrative- judicial tribunals quickly
demonstrated superior expertise and efficiency, and INDECOPI received more
and more cases, since parties had few reasons to file in court. Doing so publicly
signaled possible plans to bribe a judge or drag out a weak case to gain leverage.
INDECOPI eventually began competing even with itself, creating a network of
non-profit "franchisees" throughout Peru that competed to satisfy headquarters'
ever-higher standards for processing of intellectual property registrations and
Peru, (July 2003) (surveying history of judicial reform in Peru and describing her experience with, as well as
her Peruvian judicial contacts' impressions of, IDB's "Basic Justice Modules" project); cf. Inter-American
Development Bank, IDB in Peru: Increasing Citizens' Access to the Courts (providing post-project evaluation,
including that modules' potential to increase productivity is only partially realized), available at http://www.
iadb.org/exr/am2004/index.cfm?language=English&Id=&PAM=&lang=E&pagePos= I &op=press&pg=25&pre
view=N.
27. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, translated by Hugh Lawson-Tancred (Penguin Classics 1999).
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other, select INDECOPI responsibilities.28 INDECOPI's demanding standards,
'combined with supervision of its brand name and the competition among
franchisees for registrants left little room for corruption.
The free market is not synonymous with the private sector. As INDECOPI
showed, free-market forces can be introduced even in the public sector, and, as
the Peruvian poultry producer demonstrated, private business can be highly
collusive-and will often choose to be if given the choice. In the United States,
local politicians reputed to be pro-business rely heavily on targeted tax
abatements and other policies that amount to little more than ensuring that
business gets its share of public largesse, within an otherwise often
anticompetitive environment. Pro-market policies, in contrast, require: (1) private
property (including human capital) rights; (2) unfettered contract rights to
negotiate the terms on which private property is traded at an arm's length; and (3)
a reliable enforcement system for those property and contract rights.
A reliable free-market enforcement system begins, but does not end, with
clear property, contract, and competition laws. In addition to bringing traditional
enforcement actions, a competition regulatory agency must fashion market-based
incentives to facilitate competition-through transparent information, prizes, and
pro-competitive structures like INDECOPI's franchisee system, and the dual-
track competition between INDECOPI and the Peruvian judiciary. For example,
in the mid-1990s, INDECOPI published periodic rankings of banks and airlines
based on waiting lines and delayed departures, respectively. Industry participants
promptly began competing to improve their rankings, and their performance
improved. 29 The exogenous power of simple rankings such as these will hold,
even if the targeted industries capture their sectoral regulatory agencies through
collusion, thereby defeating any effort to impose formal legal requirements.
A strong competition agency to regulate antitrust, consumer protection, and
unfair business practices can thereby foster competition even in areas where the
private sector has sheltered itself by colluding with its sectoral regulator. Anti-
corruption czars, ombudsmen, and non-governmental organizations can wield
many of these market-based mechanisms as well. Similar mechanisms can also
target government agencies, forcing them through competition to improve their
performance in areas lagging because of corruption. This requires refocusing
incentives toward career promotion, reputation, budgets, and other public sector
equivalents of the private sector's profit motive.
Still, the profit motive of the private sector remains the principal mechanism
for generating competition. If government is rich and big enough to determine
many of the winners and losers in life, then human nature will propel collusion
with government officials. But if government is limited, principally providing the
28. Beatriz Boza, The Role of Indecopi in Peru: The First Five Years of Indecopi, in BOZA, supra note
18, at 12-13 (providing statistics on INDECOPI's conflict resolution services).
29. Id. at 32-37 (reproducing public ranking published by INDECOPI for gasoline, banks, airlines, bus
lines, and produce markets).
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three components of a free market described above, then an adequately regulated
private sector's ever-demanding competition for profit can work its magic. The
comfortable inefficiency caused by industry-wide collusion with the government
will be broken up by foreign or other new entrants' search for competitive
advantage, and jealous competitors will help blow the whistle on any collusion
that another firm uses to win an unfair advantage from the government.
III. MARKET-BASED ANTI-COLLUSION MECHANISMS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY
The United Nations (U.N.) Millennium Declaration in 2000 called on
developed countries to provide (1) "duty- and quote-free access for essentially all
exports from the least developed countries," (2) "enhanced ... debt relief for the
heavily indebted poor countries.., in return for their making demonstrable
commitments to poverty reduction;" and (3) "more generous development
assistance, especially to countries that are genuinely making an effort to apply
their resources to poverty reduction."30 The declaration also committed U.N.
members to "special measures ... [for] Africa, including debt cancellation,
improved market access, enhanced Official Development Assistance and
increased flows of Foreign Direct Investment .... ,31
The Group of Eight (G8)-the United States, Japan, Germany, Great Britain,
Canada, France, Italy, and Russia-promptly took up that agenda at their 2001
summit in Genoa, Italy, and subsequent summits." By the time of the 2005 G8
summit at Gleneagles, in Scotland, those policy prescriptions from the
Millennium Declaration had worked their way into public consciousness in the
form of a popular refrain: debt, aid, and trade.33 Below, we consider how market-
based efforts to combat collusion would work in the context of each of these
three pillars of Gleneagles-style development policy.
A. International Trade
Among debt (relief), (foreign) aid, and (international) trade, trade is the most
important. Beginning in 2004, the Copenhagen Consensus, a Danish think-tank,
has identified all major development priorities addressed by the U.N. and invited
a panel of the world's leading economists to apply a rigorous cost-benefit
analysis to answer the following question: "If we had an extra $75 billion to do
good for the world over the coming four years, where could that money do the
30. U.N. General Assembly Res. 55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000) at 15.
31. Id.at 28.
32. E.g., G8 Communique, July 22, 2001 (Genoa, Italy) at H 7, 10, 14.
33. See, e.g., http://www.debtaidtrade.org (website of all-party caucus within House of Commons of the
United Kingdom, which hosted 2005 G8 Summit at Gleneagles).
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most good? 34 Their analysis found that trade provides more bang for the buck
than almost any other development priority.35
Fundamentally, foreign aid and debt relief are both transfer payments,
generating an initial loss for the transferor and a gain for the transferee. If the
transferred money is used well, then it creates ongoing gains for the transferee.
This can also redound somewhat to the benefit of the transferor.
But trade is different-it requires no transfer payment. Negotiating trade
liberalization costs little-negotiator salaries and plane tickets, versus the many
billions in direct payments that foreign aid and debt relief cost donor countries.
There are certainly individual winners and losers in both developed and
developing economies, but the net economic effect is positive for all countries
involved, since the resulting increase in trade creates major net economic gains,
and since every country has comparative advantages. In other words, trade
liberalization is a win-win proposition. Instead of developed countries paying a
price to provide the benefits of trade liberalization to developing countries,
developed countries receive a big benefit as well.
The World Bank estimates that developing countries alone would receive
$86 billion in static gains if the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations
is successful, lifting 65 million people out of poverty by 2015.36 The total global
gain is estimated at $287 billion. These gains result from comparative advantage
and, more generally, the value-creating nature of trades: when two parties make a
trade, they both end up with something that they value more than what they gave
up in the trade. But the pixy dust that makes trade liberalization really magical is
the dynamic improvement in economies' efficiency due to the increased
competition that trade liberalization brings. With the inclusion of this dynamic
effect, the World Bank estimates the total global gain of a successful Doha
Round at $461 billion.37
Trade liberalization is the ultimate example of development policy that
incorporates market-based anti-collusion mechanisms, because trade liberali-
zation increases competition. In some circles, trade agreements are depicted as
collusive plots by a global elite intent on undermining national sovereignty and
ruling the world from the World Trade Organization's (WTO)'s Geneva
headquarters. To the contrary, trade liberalization simply removes legal and
regulatory detritus that accumulated during long periods of protectionist
collusion at the national level. The role of the WTO, other supranational entities,
34. SOLUTIONS FOR THE WORLD'S BIGGEST PROBLEMS: COSTS AND BENEFITS 6 (Bjorn Lomborg, ed.,
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
35. Copenhagen Consensus, http://www.copenhagenconsensus.comDefault.aspx?ID=158 (listing trade
liberalization among the four "very good" projects, along with controlling HIV/AIDS, providing micro-
nutrients, and control of malaria).
36. Kym Anderson, Will Martin, & Dominique von der Mensbrughe, Global Impacts of the Doha
Scenarios on Poverty, World Bank Policy Working Paper No. 3735 (Oct. 2005) (noting that developing country
gains increase to $142 billion if Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are added).
37. Id.
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and international arbitration more generally, is not to force countries to institute
certain policies, but rather to compensate those who would be harmed if
countries reinstitute collusive policies that they have voluntarily committed not to
reinstitute. In other words, rather than ratcheting up government to the
international level, trade liberalization strips away government interference in
free-market competition and, thereby, weakens collusion." By shielding
prudential and national security regulation, free trade agreements also encourage
countries to provide the necessary regulatory support for a stable and well-
functioning free market.
Trade liberalization encourages domestic businesses to become more
efficient, as described previously. Protectionist rules allow businessmen to get
rich through lunches at the country club with their "competitors" and local public
officials. People tend to focus their efforts on whatever rewards them, so over
time, businessmen in protectionist economies become good at country-
clubbing-and not much else. But once faced with new entrants from abroad,
businesses begin to get back into shape, which benefits customers and the
broader economy.
However, pushing through trade liberalization over the traditional colluders'
objections is the first trick, and requires a beachhead of competition. One step is
to build and highlight support for a pro-trade coalition of new, competitive
domestic businesses that resent the vested business interests' advantages.
Another step is to engender a competitive popular spirit by showing that other
countries are reaping the benefits of free trade and investment while your own
country is losing out. Another critical step is to ensure genuine democratic, multi-
party elections. Free elections and the right of voluntary association allow free-
market parties to develop and to compete for votes by contrasting their ideas-
freedom, competition, innovation, and industriousness-with socialist or
otherwise protectionist alternatives.
On the back side, there is always danger that new international business
entrants will simply "join the club" and begin colluding with local vested
interests and public officials. But this is significantly less likely than is collusion
prior to trade liberalization. First, newcomers from overseas have less incentive
to share benefits with local, inefficient businesses that they believe they can beat
outright through competition. Second, international entrants, as untrusted and
untrusting outsiders from a different culture, do not initially have the ties to
collude seamlessly. Third, public officials will often find it politically dangerous
to collude with international business interests.
In World on Fire, Amy Chua argues that raw democracy and raw capitalism
are combustible, since ethnic minorities often achieve disproportionate economic
success, setting up a clash with a less economically accomplished ethnic
38. See Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florenzio Lopez, & Andrei Schleifer, The Regulation of
Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2002) (concluding that corruption is greater in economies that impede new entrants
through protectionism or bureaucratic red tape).
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majority. This effect may result in populists like Zimbabwe's Mugabe
maintaining power by scapegoating white farmers or in the widespread riots that
broke out against Chinese merchants in Indonesia once Suharto's authoritarian
grasp began to slip in 1998 during the Asian financial crisis. 39 But Chua's
examples lie at the extremes. Alternatively, the interplay between capitalism and
democracy may encourage savvy public officials to resist state capture by
international business interests-lest the government on which they rely for a job
be voted out of office. In short, democratic competition can encourage economic
competition once trade liberalization occurs. Collusion will not disappear, but it
can be reduced.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which is enforced by
the WTO, recognizes international investment as one of the four modes of
international trade.40 The U.N. Millennium Declaration explicitly mentions
"increased flows of Foreign Direct Investment" (FDI) as one of the "special
measures" developed countries should pursue to help Africa, along with debt,
aid, and other forms of trade. The preceding discussion of trade applies to
international investment, as well. 4' But one major vehicle for promoting FDI-
privatization and concession contracts-is worth considering more closely, given
allegations that have earned privatization the moniker "briberization" in some
countries. 2
Corruption within privatizations is flanked by, and must be analyzed together
with, corruption both before and after privatizations. Prior to privatization,
corruption plagues the day-to-day operations of state-owned enterprises,
undermining their productivity. After privatization, corruption takes the form of
state capture. The government agency created to regulate the newly private
business may, instead, begin colluding with that business. Corruption during the
privatization process can take many forms, including setting artificially low
prices for state assets, in return for kickbacks. For example, in 1994 Banco
Occidental de Descuento (then a small regional bank in Venezuela) was
privatized. Only a few weeks later, the new owner sold a minority stake that
valued the company at almost eight times the privatization price. 43 Corruption
39. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC
HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 16-17 (Anchor Books 2003).
40. General Agreement in Trade in Services, Art. I, §2(c), at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal
e/26-gats.pdf (defining "trade in services" to include "the supply of a service.., by a service supplier of one
Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member"), available at http://www.
wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/26-gats.pdf.
41. W. L. Meggison & J. M. Netter, From State to Market: a Survey of Empirical Studies on Privati-zation
39 J. ECON. LIT. 321 (2001) (concluding that privatizations generally produced positive economic effects).
42. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 58 (Penguin Press 2002).
43. Luigi Manzetti & Charles Blake, Market Reform and Corruption in Latin America, 3 REV. INT'L
POL. ECON. 662, 681-82 (1996) (citing prices per share of 320 and 2500 bolfvars); also SUSAN ROSE-
ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CASES, CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM (Press Syndicate Univ. of
Cambridge 1999) (noting the subjectivity of business valuation, which gives public officials opportunities for
kickbacks in return for setting low prices).
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may also result in the state granting the winning bidder an unnecessarily long
monopoly right. Thereby, privatizations meant to increase competition may
instead result in greater market concentration. 4
It should come as no surprise that privatizations are often the occasion for
corruption. After all, they are massive transactions negotiated and implemented
by the same governments whose corrupt ongoing management of state assets is
one of the principal arguments for privatizations. But in The Duchess of Malf!,
Antonio declares, "[B]etter fall once, than be ever falling. 45 In that sense,
privatizations are an opportunity to fall once. Falling once, in the right
circumstances, offers a tactical advantage over the ongoing corruption
occasioned by state ownership of potentially productive assets. By concentrating
the opportunity for corruption into one big transaction, even countries with a
weak system of accountability should be able to assemble temporary vigilance.
For example, the size of the transaction justifies the cost of hiring independent
valuation consultants apart from the main investment bank A privatization is also
far more newsworthy than the day-to-day operation of a state-owned enterprise,
so it is easier to recruit journalistic vigilance. A respected international
organization like Transparency International can also be recruited to monitor the
deal. Every privatization and concession is different, but international
organizations should also provide model contracts and identify procedural best
practices to which countries should be encouraged to ascribe before beginning
the process.46 No fall is pleasant, but proper preparation makes it possible to
guard against as much corruption as possible.
Post-privatization, the temptation toward state capture could be viewed as a
continuation of the drip-by-drip corruption problem faced by the enterprise
before privatization. But it is not. As previously discussed, regulators will find it
politically dangerous to collude with an international business that has won a
high-profile privatization contract. In addition, one of the reasons that it is
important to grant monopoly rights for as short a transition period as possible (if
at all) is because domestic competitors will raise a public stink if an a big
multinational gets special breaks. Even if regulators and all players in the sector
manage to collude, potential new entrants-including multinationals that have
won similar privatizations in neighboring countries-still exert competitive
pressures and make too much collusion economically dangerous.
44. LUIGI MANZETTI, PRIVATIZATION SOUTH AMERICAN STYLE (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (arguing
that many South American privatizations resulted in increased market concentration, not less, due to this effect).
45. JOHN WEBSTER, THE DUCHESS OF MALFI, Act V, Scene 1 (1623) (quoting Antonio, speaking with
Delio).
46. See COLLIER, infra note 54, at 140-46, 153-156, 183 (proposing voluntary international charters on
investment and on natural resource extraction contracts).
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B. Foreign Aid
Much foreign aid is less concerned with development than with geopolitics
and other donor country goals." For example, the United States gives over $2
billion annually in foreign aid to Israel, which had GDP per capita of $26,800 in
2006.48 In addition, the United States' largest foreign aid program in Latin
America-Plan Colombia-funds not only development projects, but also
significant coca eradication and anti-narcotraffic measures. 49 As defined by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), official
development assistance (ODA) is only that portion of foreign aid paid by
developed countries' governments to poor countries for the purpose of
development. ODA is most commonly what "debt, aid and trade" boosters mean
when they invoke the second pillar of their mantra.55
... At Gleneagles, G8 countries agreed to increase ODA to Africa by
over 100 percent between 2004 and 2010-an increase of $25 billion.5"
The European members in particular agreed to increase their ODA
budgets to seven tenths of one percent of their gross domestic product
(GDP) by 2015, following through on a pledge they made previously at
the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. The United States refused to
link its ODA level to its GDP. The 0.7 percent benchmark-and
countries' failure to reach it-goes all the way back to a U.N. resolution
in 1970, which required members to exert their "best efforts" to reach
that level of aid.52
One reason this long-term goal has yet to be reached may be that several
demoralizing studies have shown ODA fails to improve recipient countries'
47. See U.S. State Department, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year
2008, available at http://www.usaid.gov/policylbudget/cbj20O8/fy2OO8cbj-full.pdf (Feb. 14, 2007), at 1, 3, and
12-14 (showing distribution of State Department's $20.3 billion FY 2008 foreign assistance request among low-
, middle-, and upper-income countries and among peace/security, governance, investing in people, economic
growth, and humanitarian assistance).
48. Id, at 492 (listing FY 2006 foreign aid to Israel of $2.5 billion and FY 2008 request of $2.4 billion)
also Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (2006) (listing Israel's GDP per capita).
49. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, FACT SHEET ON PLAN COLOMBIA, available at http://www.state.govl
p/wha/rls/fs/2001/1042.htm (March 14, 2001) (listing first-year appropriations of $129.4 million for increased
interdiction, $122 million for human rights and judicial reform, $390.5 million for military aid against
Colombian rebels, $81 million for alternative economic development, and $115.6 million for the Colombian
police).
50. E.g., http://www.netaid.orglglobal-poverty/aid-debt-trade/ (describing components of Mercy Corps'
NetAid program).
51. Group of Eight, Gleneagles Communique 927-28 (2005).
52. U.N. General Assembly Res. No. 2626, 43 (Oct. 24, 1970) ("Each economically advanced country
will ... exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount [of ODA] of 0.7 percent of its gross national
product by the middle of the Decade").
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development.5 3 In The Bottom Billion, Paul Collier, former director of research at
the World Bank, argues that poverty is rapidly decreasing in most countries, but
that the 50 poorest countries-home to "the bottom billion"-are so poorly run
that the significant ODA they receive is often ineffective, misused, or stolen. 4
Other studies suggest that ODA encourages growth of the public sector vis-A-vis
the private sector, thereby decreasing economic freedom and growth,55 and that
donor countries tend to cut back their aid when countries allow greater economic
freedom.5 6 In other words, aid tends to go to countries with autocratic rulers well-
situated to steal it, and donor countries give them an extra incentive not to
liberalize-nor to stop stealing. In the worst case, ODA is nothing more than a
new stream of funds to be divvied up through collusion.
Notwithstanding this research, some studies suggest that ODA can be
beneficial-but only if it is properly structured 7 In particular, the aid allocation
process should be structured to maximize competition and should target market-
based reforms that improve governance. Several foreign aid trends are promising
in this regard. One is the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). In March
2002, President Bush joined other world leaders in agreeing to the so-called
Monterrey Consensus at the U.N. Conference on Financing for Development.
Consistent with that global consensus, President Bush announced that the United
States would increase its ODA by $5 billion, distributed not through the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) but rather through a new entity,
using a new approach.58 In 2004, MCC was established to implement that new
approach, which is based on the principle that "aid is most effective when it
reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in people."59
From those three broad categories, MCC has identified 17 indicators of
commitment to development, on which a country's policies must receive a
passing grade to be eligible for an aid compact from MCC.60
53. E.g., William Easterly, Ross Levine & David Roodman, "New Data, New Doubts: A Comment on
Burnside and Dollar's 'Aid, Policies, and Growth'," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No. 9846 (Cambridge 2003) (finding that aid generally fails to contribute to development even in countries with
good policies).
54. PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT
CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (Oxford University Press 2007).
55. E.g., P.T. BAUER, THE DEVELOPMENT FRONTIER (Harvard University Press 1991).
56. Benjamin Powell & Matt Ryan, "Development Aid and Economic Freedom: Are They Related?"
Independent Institute Working Paper No. 60 (May 9, 2005), available at http://www.independent.org/pdf/
working- papers/60_aid.pdf
57. E.g., Craig Burnside & David Dollar, "Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence," World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3251 (Mar. 1, 2004), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/
wbrwps/3251.html (providing evidence that ODA's development impact depends on quality and relative
corruption of public institutions and policy) but see Easterly et al, supra note 53 (providing evidence that
contradicts the Burnside and Dollar article from 2000, which reached same finding as their 2004 article).
58. White House Fact Sheet on the Millennium Challenge Account, (Mar. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations/millennium.html.
59. Millennium Challenge Corporation, http://www.mcc.gov/about/index.php.
60. Id. at tp://www.mcc.gov/selection/ indicators/index.php.
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Nearly four years later, MCC is now widely criticized for having dispensed
only a small portion of its available funds, and Congress is likely to appropriate
far less than the $3 billion President Bush requested for MCC in the 2008
budget.6' This criticism reflects the failed mindset of traditional foreign aid, both
nationally and at the international financial institutions. Aid officers'
effectiveness should not be judged principally by how much money they can
dispense, and how quickly. It is appropriate, not only in this initial phase, but
indefinitely, for MCC to delay project funding until recipient countries have
satisfied project prerequisites. Given the serious doubts about ODA's
effectiveness in countries without proper policies in place, most of the aid game
should be in creating incentives for better policy. One (but not the only) incentive
should be withholding aid until potential recipients can show that they have laid
adequate groundwork. So long as MCC continues to have significant available
funds, it functions as a market-based incentive for policy reform even among
countries that are not yet receiving aid. This effect can be seen in any contest: all
competitors, not just the winner, improve their performance. Competition for
ODA by and among developing countries can be a powerful development tool, if
the indicators on which countries compete indeed correlate with development.
The incentive of MCC funding appears to be working; countries seeking aid
compacts from MCC have improved 25 percent more than other countries on the
17 measures that determine MCC eligibility.62 MCC provides Threshold Program
Assistance grants to speed the reforms of countries that have reached the cusp of
eligibility.63 Unlike traditional aid,64 however, countries have an incentive to
ensure that these grants produce results. Otherwise, they fail to reach eligibility
and thereby lose access to far greater funds.
In addition to generating its own accomplishments, MCC serves as a
competitor for USAID, thereby encouraging improvements in that agency's more
traditional methodology. MCC accounts for about ten percent of total U.S.
foreign aid.65 The broader State Department, Treasury Department, Commerce
Department, U.S. Trade Representative, and other U.S. Government agencies
also play a role in dispensing ODA. The role of the Defense Department, in
particular, has increased significantly in the last few years due to reconstruction
61. See Celia W. Dugger, U.S. Agency's Slow Pace Endanger's Foreign Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007,
at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.coni/2007/l2/07/worldlafrica/07millennium.html (citing Center for
Global Development expert who believes it is justifiable that MCC has spent only $155 million of $4.8 billion
approved for projects, since recipient countries need long time to accomplish prerequisites for project
initiation); compare with Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Statement on FY 2008 Budget Request," (Feb. 5,
2007) (justifying FY 2008 $3 billion budget request).
62. Doug Johnson & Tristan Zajonc, Can Foreign Aid Create an Incentive for Good Governance?-
Evidence from the Millenium Challenge Corporation, (April 11, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn. com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=896293.
63. MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, REPORT ON MCC THRESHOLD PROGRAM (2007),
available at http://www.mcc.gov/about/reports/other/mcc_032706_threshold-report.pdf
64. See Powell & Ryan, supra note 56 (finding that ODA tends to fall as economic freedom increases).
65. Dugger, supra note 61.
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efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the development-oriented mission of the
armed services' Africa Command, which was established in 2007.
66
In 2004, a few months before MCC began, Congress created the U.S.
Commission on Helping to Enhance the Livelihood of People (the HELP
Commission), to recommend reforms to the current structure of U.S. ODA.67
Some members of the Commission considered recommending that all ODA
responsibilities be consolidated into a "Super-State Department," but the
Commission settled for less sweeping recommendations, including a reduction in
the number of agencies responsible for development, as well as strengthening of
USAID "in areas where [Department of Defense] has taken on their traditional
development responsibilities in recent years so that [Department of Defense] can
remain focused on its core functions. 68
The HELP Commission makes a strong case that the current U.S. foreign aid
system is ineffective and requires more intentional design, after over four
decades of piecemeal changes and incidental evolution since passage of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. However, the Commission underestimates both
the value of managed, intra-governmental competition and the danger of
consolidating too much responsibility for ODA. The State/USAID culture has
strengths and weaknesses, and only some of those weaknesses might be cured
through greater authority and economies of scale.
Rather, the weaknesses of the traditional foreign aid model can be minimized
by more carefully apportioning ODA responsibilities among several agencies that
have different sets of strengths and weaknesses. One agency may minimize
corruption through rigid DC-centric rules, as USAID does, with "encourage-
ment" from Congressional mandates. 69 Another may increase productivity
through greater decentralization and untied grants, but at the cost of more
corruption. Yet another, like MCC, may set high governance standards for aid
recipients, thereby encouraging competitive improvements, but also limiting the
total aid dispensed. By supporting several aid agencies, the nation may generate a
greater net development after corruption than any one agency can generate on its
own. This structure is analogous to a well-managed investment portfolio, in
which risk is diversified by combining numerous stocks with low correlations.
66. See U.S. Africa Command, http://www.africom.milIAboutAFRICOM.asp (last visited Jan. 16,
2008); see also http://www.africom.mil/africomFAQs.asp ("Designers of U.S. Africa Command clearly
understand the relationships between security, development, diplomacy and prosperity in Africa"); see also
http://www.africom.mil/africomFAQs.asp.
67. HELP Commission Act, 22 U.S.C. §2394b (July 23, 2004).
68. HELP Commission, Recommendations for Legislative Action, Recommendations 2.2-2 & 6.1-1,
available at http://www.helpcommission.gov/portals/O/recommendations-final.pdf.
69. See e.g., Editorial, Food for the World, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2007, at A8 (arguing that some
Congressional mandates on contracting diminish USAID effectiveness); compare with Randall Wood, Program
Officer, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Incentives and Capacity at the Millennium Challenge Corporation,
available at http://www.therandymon.com/papers/incentives-capacity.pdf ("MCA was designed to be free from the
constraints of contradictory, and sometimes self-defeating, Congressional earmarks that have historically reduced
or crippled other organizations' ability to react efficiently").
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 20
High-level coordination, through the Deputy National Security Advisor for
International Economics rather than the State Department, which is too closely
tied to the traditional model and to geopolitical concerns, would help ensure that
competition is constructive and structural, rather than behavioral. As in the
investment arena, agencies' share of funding should be re-weighted periodically
based on medium-term net development results-but not so often that agencies
are unable to do medium-term planning.
Even this market-based structure for ODA would not come close to the level
of organic complexity that the private and non-profit sectors bring to
development assistance. U.S. public charities hold over $1 trillion in assets, and
approximately 50,000 private foundations in the United States hold another $500
billion.7° Both are expected to expand logarithmically as the wealthy baby
boomer generation hits prime age for charitable giving. A large portion of this
private giving is for domestic causes, but private money certainly plays a major
role in the financing of international development. The largest U.S. private
foundation alone-the Gates Foundation, with nearly $40 billion and a claim on
over $100 billion moreT-focuses on development issues, especially global
health, and has the heft to walk shoulder-to-shoulder, or go toe-to-toe, with U.S.
•72
government programs.
Thus, private philanthropy has the scale to put "best practices" competitive
pressure on U.S. ODA programs,73 as well as allowing government officials to
choose among a wide array of approaches by a wide array of charities through
which government can channel ODA. The proliferation of private actors would
generally increase competition and reduce corruption, but private foundations are
often insulated from competitive forces because they operate under their
endowments, and state attorneys general are unable to provide more than cursory
ex-ante supervision. Thus, it is especially promising that a new generation of
business-minded philanthropists is insisting on rigorous results-based project
70. See U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 Returns of 501(c)(3) Organizations: Balance Sheet
and Income Statement Items, by Asset Size (2004) available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04eo0las.xls
(providing most recent asset data reported by IRS for public charities: $1.2 billion); Thomas J. Tierney, Higher-
Impact Philanthropy: Applying Business Principles to Philanthropic Strategies, PHILANTHROPY, (Feb. 14,
2007), http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/article.asp?article= 1453&cat= 147 (quantifying private founda-
tion assets).
71. Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Foundation Fact Sheet, available at http://www.Gates
foundation.org/MediaCenter/FactSheet/default.htm (listing endowment of $37.6 billion as of Sept. 30, 2007);
Matthew Miller, The Forbes 400, FORBES (Sept. 20, 2007), http://www.forbes.com/2007/09/19/richest-
americans-forbes-lists-richlist07-cxmm-0920rich-land.html (listing net worth of Bill Gates and Warren Buffet
at $59 billion and $52 billion, respectively).
72. Compare U.S. State Department, supra note 47 (listing $20.3 billion FY 2008 budget request for
foreign assistance, including $3 billion for MCC) with I.R.C. §4942 (requiring private foundations to make
annual minimum distributions of five percent of assets, i.e., $2 billion annually, given Gates Foundation's
current asset size).
73. Cf. Tierney, supra note 70 (citing 2002 self-evaluation by $500 million Annenberg Challenge, which
found mixed results, given financial mismatch between Annenberg budget and $11.4 billion New York City
school system it sought to reform).
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management, through their own private foundations or by actively earmarking
contributions to public charities. 74 Otherwise, government anti-corruption efforts
will only succeed in shifting more corruption to the non-profit sector, which can
collude with government funders or aid recipients. (Both private foundations and
public charities are tax-exempt organizations and owe to taxpayers a duty of
faithfulness to their charitable purpose, and not personal enrichment.)
Independent public charities are more responsive to competitive pressures than
are captive charities established and funded by one private foundation, because
they must compete for private and/or public monies.
Ironically, one of the most cutting-edge models for market competition in the
private and non-profit sectors is a new form of cooperation, which is changing
the way business and, increasingly, government are done.75 Social production,
also known as peer production, uses virtual networks to bring together hundreds,
thousands, or even millions, of people with similar interests, for the purpose of
creating a shared information product. The magic of this popular collaboration is
that, even though it sacrifices the quality control that a closed, expert-led process
could provide, it can exceed expert-level quality and output because of the sheer
number of participants, who are surprisingly reliable in the aggregate. The user-
edited encyclopedia Wikipedia.com, may be one of the most famous examples,
but social production can just as easily be used to solve development problems
through mass collaboration, as the Development Gateway Foundation is already
demonstrating.76 Foreign aid should promote social production in the developing
world, since one of the keys to growth is tapping new sources of productivity
gains.
At first glance, however, social production's wild decentralization and lack
of formalized quality control suggests greater opportunity for corruption and
abuse. Indeed, intellectual property laws must respect the shared nature of the
product (unless a sponsor discloses to participants that product ownership will be
restricted). But corruption is less likely than it may seem. Collusion is difficult
because a network's expansion is uncontrolled, which allows new entrants to
shift activity away from any purposes that have been skewed by illicit collusion.
There is an inverse relationship between the number of participants in a plot and
the probability of detection, so participants also cannot co-opt new entrants
without quickly exceeding the optimum number. Furthermore, because social
74. John A. Byrne, The New Face of Philanthropy, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 2, 2002, at 5.
75. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (Yale University Press 2006) (describing numerous examples of social
production, including technical mapping work "outsourced" by NASA through open social network); see also
DON TAPSCOTr & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: How MASS COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERY-
THING 9 (Penguin 2006) (describing cash-prize internet competition to help gold mining company locate gold
reserves).
76. Development Gateway, http://topics.developmentgateway.org/ (describing DG Communities as
"knowledge sharing and collaboration.. .for professionals working to... promote sustainable development
worldwide").
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production elevates the value of a shared network, reputation within that network
becomes the undisputed coin of the new realm. Ever-improved mechanisms to
calibrate reputation within social networks are indispensable. Even the
elementary buyer and seller ratings on Ebay.com influence transactions, for
example. Low-quality contributors quickly lose their ability to attract network
relationships, which are also important for traditional projects in the relevant
sector, not just whatever shared product the network is producing. In short,
foreign aid can enthusiastically promote social production in developing
countries without too much concern about whether it will increase corruption or,
for that matter, terrorist plots and other invidious collusion.
Thus far, we have primarily discussed foreign aid structure and methodology,
but project prioritization is equally important. The Copenhagen Consensus'
analysis of the bang for the buck generated by potential development projects
puts HIV/AIDS and malaria at the top of the list, along with a few other health-
related projects and trade liberalization." HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment are
so critical to the productive capacity of Africa that DATA, the organization co-
founded by Bono to promote debt, aid, and trade in Africa now notes that the first
"A" in its name stands for AIDS, not aid in general.78 But another top priority for
foreign aid should be trade capacity building. This is a corollary to the previous
section's argument that trade liberalization is essential to corruption-minimized
development.
A corollary to the arguments above in favor of MCC is that traditional
foreign aid should also give significant priority to governance reforms. One of
the weaknesses of the Washington policy community is that every interest group
tends to argue as if its priority could be pursued without sacrificing other
priorities. In that tradition, a paper focusing on corruption would be expected to
argue in favor of targeting foreign aid to governance reforms. But this is the
correct answer even if our only concern is development, not corruption and
governance per se. As discussed above, research and practical experience suggest
that foreign aid is ineffective without good governance.79 Collier's The Bottom
Billion accepts this reality while constructively making the case for a narrow
foreign aid agenda in the poorest countries, with governance reform front and
center.8° Notwithstanding many important priorities, ODA should focus first on
building the good governance and free market structures that are necessary to
channel subsequent ODA into satisfactory development results. Within narrow
parameters, this ODA is essential to development, since the poorest countries are
in such bad shape that even higher-than-average growth rates are failing to
generate improvements in human welfare.'
77. Copenhagen Consensus, supra note 35.
78. Debt AIDS Trade Africa (DATA), http://www.data.org.
79. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
80. See COLLIER, supra note 54, at 99-123 and 175-192.
81. Id. at 8-9.
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An appropriately narrow agenda for ODA should include trade capacity
building, competition policy, free and fair elections, public budget transparency,
and other mechanisms to ensure public access to relevant, reliable, and timely
information. Because many of the world's poorest countries have abundant
natural resources, transparency is particularly important in setting and accounting
for royalties. Collier argues convincingly for auctions to minimize the
opportunity for corruption .
Benchmarks are another important tool, which foreign aid should support.
Ciudadanos al Dfa (CAD), a praxis-oriented think tank in Peru that focuses on
good governance and citizenship empowerment, 3 was founded by Beatriz Boza
after she left her post as President of INDECOPI before the end of Fujimori's
tenure, only to see the institution's stellar reputation quickly subverted by
corruption. In The Other Path,s Hernando de Soto highlighted the mind-numbing
red tape of Peruvian local government, which is inextricably entwined with
corruption. CAD follows up on that research by measuring the speed, cost, and
transparency of business licensing in municipalities throughout Peru and in all
the districts of Lima.85 This benchmarking has created a basis for competition
among local governments-and a basis for citizens' electoral punishment of
public officials whose corruption-laden performance lags.
But benchmarking is just the first of four steps; the second is to create
rewards for those who perform well against the benchmarks. CAD awards annual
prizes for good governance in numerous categories, at the national, regional, and
local levels of government. 6 Even those applicants who do not win still improve
their performance and, in the process of preparing an application, develop a
deeper understanding of their own efforts. As a result, they become better able to
articulate their plans and principles to others, particularly within their
organizations.
The third step is to offer training in good governance to capitalize on the
demand benchmarks and prizes create. CAD publishes numerous manuals,
including a review of the governance "best practices" created by annual prize
winners. It also organizes in-depth courses throughout Peru for local government
officials, as well as numerous seminars and an annual conference on good
87governance.
82. Id. at 38-52, 135-156, 180.
83. Ciudadanos al Dfa, http://www.ciudadanosaldia.org (full disclosure: the author was previously
employed Beatriz Boza, both during her tenure in the Peruvian government and at CAD).
84. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (Harper & Row 1989), first published in Spanish as EL
OTRO SENDERO: LA REVOLUCION INFORMAL (Editorial Barranco 1986).
85. Ciudadanos al Dfa, Reports Nos. 12 and 28, available at http://www.ciudadanosaldia.org/informes/
default.htm (listing many additional CAD reports, measuring other performance indicators for both local and
national government).
86. Id. at http://www.ciudadanosaldia.org/premiobpg/ (listing rules for 2008 prize, as well as past prize
winners).
87. Id. at http://www.ciudadanosaldia.org/congresobpg/07/ (describing the annual Congress on Good
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The fourth step is to create a network for the new class of good governance
practitioners that the first three steps will identify, encourage, and train. The
Peruvian judiciary and most of Peru's traditional ministries were never well-
developed and respected institutions, but Fujimori's corruption undermined them
further. In contrast, Fujimori allowed INDECOPI, FONCODES, and several
other agencies to operate as largely independent "islands of excellence" during
most of his administration. In the end, he undermined even these pillars when his
difficult bid for reelection in 2000 required all the instruments of governance.
But from 1990 to 1998, a new class of modem, effective leaders blossomed in
these agencies-a class that now increasingly holds important posts throughout
the Peruvian government and represents the country's promising future. In short,
the only way to truly institutionalize good governance is to invest in people-
individuals whose career prospects are based on their branding as good
governance practitioners. Collier argues that one of foreign aid's principal aims
should be to empower these local reformers.88 CAD's programs are doing exactly
that, adding to Peru's critical mass of good governance practitioners, including
the many former INDECOPI officials who served under CAD's president when
she headed INDECOPI.
The hard, long-term process of building a network for people who represent a
good governance "brand" cannot be replaced by the purely short-term strategy of
centralizing power in a white knight, as the Palestinian Authority has done in
choosing Dr. Salam Fayyad as finance minister and now prime minister.89
Institutionalization has a human face-but it is the face of a group, holding
power diffused across numerous institutions and positions. No matter how
authentic and unshakeable one individual's branding for honesty, the right person
can easily be removed in an instant-at which point excessive centralization
becomes a problem, rather than the solution.
The Peruvian case demonstrates one additional tool that is essential in
forming a market for good governance, and which foreign aid should support: a
free press. The debate over Fujimori's legacy is largely over whether his
corruption or his governing effectiveness ultimately predominated. 9° But those
two sides of Fujimori are fused: his administration's effectiveness extended to
the art of corruption. As it became clear that Fujimori might not win the 2000
elections, Montesinos bribed far and wide. He claims to have 30,000 videos of
his collusive pacts, and he kept meticulous record of every transaction, even
Governance in Lima) and http://www.ciudadanosaldia.org/tallerescad/2007/default.htm (identifying cities
throughout Peru to which CAD's workshop "roadshow" traveled).
88. COLLIER, supra note 54, at 175-192.
89. Barak Ravid, Everyone's Favorite Palestinian, HAARETZ (Apr. 1, 2007) (describing Fayyad's
selection as prime minister and noting his well-deserved reputation as effective crusader against corruption).
90. E.g., Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, & Andrei
Shleifer, The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595, 614 (Dec. 2003) (arguing that results
Fujimori accomplished required stability purchased through corruption and outweighed his corruption).
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requiring many bribe recipients to sign receipts and contracts.9' Montesinos'
meticulous, effective corruption gives us insight into how best to buy-or avoid
someone's buying-control of the levers of democratic power. Montesinos'
records show bribes to local and national politicians, cabinet ministers, voters,
judges, businessmen-but most of all, to the press.
Bribes of $10,000 to $35,000 per person, per month were sufficient to buy
the cooperation of the majority of Peru's five-judge Supreme Court. For between
$5000 and $20,000 per person, per month, enough opposition legislators
switched parties to give Fujimori's Change 90/New Majority coalition a
majority. But it was for news media that Montesinos dug deep; television stations
were bought off for $500,000 to $1.5 million per month, and just one of many
cheap tabloids received over $1.5 million in total.92 In short, the most effective
bulwark against--or instrument of-corruption is the press, because the press
informs voters' decisions in the political marketplace. Thus, if we must minimize
corruption in order for ODA to be effective, some portion of ODA must support
free press, whether traditional or electronic. Otherwise, the first dollar of ODA is
just an incentive to silence the press, so that it becomes easier to steal the second
dollar of ODA, not to mention countless other acts of corruption.
In sum, foreign aid may be largely ineffective unless it is carefully structured
and targeted. In particular, we must structure the aid allocation process to
maximize competition. We must direct funds toward the creation of free markets,
including a market for good governance, which in turn undergirds a free market
for goods and services. Within these parameters, there is ample room for foreign
aid. Yet a market-based approach to aid must not be afraid to cut off project
funds in response to poor performance, no matter how perfect the project may be
in theory. This may seem to add insult to the bottom billion's injury, but it is not
so much insult as incentive.
C. Debt Relief
At Gleneagles, G-8 countries agreed to the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
(MDRI), which is designed to cancel all debts owed to the World Bank's
International Development Association, the IMF, and the African Development
Fund by the world's most unsustainably indebted countries. The MDRI
complements the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), which was
established by the World Bank and the IMF in 1996 and enhanced in 1999, with
the encouragement of the Jubilee 2000 movement. Between the two programs, 40
countries-most of them Sub-Saharan African-are eligible for significant debt
relief, explicitly for the purpose of poverty reduction and development. The net
present value of this debt relief, as of 2005 when MDRI was announced, was $63
91. McMillan & Zoido, supra note 21, at 6-8, 14-15.
92. Id.
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billion. Like grant-based foreign aid, this debt relief provides a major new
revenue stream available for development-and for corruption.
Debt relief puts money back into the hands of the same governments-
sometimes even the same officials-that wracked up the unsustainable debts now
being forgiven. To discourage corrupt transfer of funds to non-development
purposes, HIPC requires each recipient country to prepare and demonstrate
compliance with a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), prepared by the
government in cooperation with civil society. The PRSP is the debt relief
equivalent of a foreign aid program: a centralized plan for employing a new
stream of funds at least officially destined for development. Thus, the discussion
in the previous section about market-based anti-collusion efforts in the foreign
aid context applies with equal force in the debt relief context.
But debt relief initiatives should also embrace a unique opportunity to fight
corruption. They should require production of reliable information on how the
debt crisis occurred, which will help create more of a market for good
governance. On the day the World Bank announced that Uganda had qualified
for HIPC debt relief, Uganda bought a $35 million Gulfstream jet for its
President-on credit. The loan was encouraged by a guarantee provided by the
U.S. government's Export-Import Bank. The World Bank delayed Uganda's debt
relief for a few months, but even HIPC's requirement of a PRSP was unable to
stop this potent symbol of collusive cycles unbroken. Over a quarter of the
countries that have qualified for HIPC hold only sham elections, if that, and only
a third audit their own budgets.93 In short, there is insufficient information about
collusion, and, even additional information will not immediately resolve the
problem, since many countries' leaders go to great lengths to ensure voters
cannot easily hold them accountable.
More information and accountability is needed even in democratic countries
with stronger economies. During Alan Garcia's first tenure as President of Peru,
from 1985 to 1990, Peru's foreign debt ballooned, Garcia's attempt to cap debt
payments unleashed economic disaster, and corruption was so rampant that
Garcia spent the 1990s in self-imposed European exile. Even now, Lima sports
miles of tracks to nowhere, from an internationally financed elevated train system
that somehow ran out of funds and was never completed. Yet Garcia is now
President again, elected in 2006. So far, he appears to be pursuing responsible
debt policy, so voters' forgiveness, or failure to learn from Garcia's corrupt first
term, may turn out to be a good gamble. It is not so much that Peruvians learned
nothing from the debt crisis, but that some of the lessons they learned may cause
problems again in the future. Peru did not qualify for debt relief under HIPC. Yet
soon after news of HIPC reached Latin America, villagers in Ollantaytambo, an
93. M.A. Thomas, Getting Debt Relief Right, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept./Oct. 2001).
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ancient Inca town between Cuzco and Machu Picchu, discussed taking out a loan
because "they have to forgive us the debt because we are poor.,
94
Truth commissions should be required under all PRSPs. South African
apartheid, Pinochet' s oppression of political opponents in Chile, and the civil war
fought between the Shining Path and Peru's military all left deep societal scars,
nagging questions, and recriminations. In all three cases, blue-ribbon com-
missions led comprehensive, transparent, and newsworthy investigations that
inculcated in the public psyche a reliable understanding of what happened and
who was to blame. As a result, the public is now better equipped to spot any
trend toward the bad old days. The Third World debt crisis involved a lot of
parties acting badly: corrupt politicians and private contractors, aggressive
commercial banks and developed countries too willing to bail them out, conflict-
ridden international financial institutions and export credit banks, bad economic
theorists, and who-knows-who-else. The collusion within and among these
groups should have been meticulously chronicled in country-specific detail by
truth commissions in every HIPC country. In a cauldron that hot, a true market
for economic accountability might just have risen to the surface. We appear to
have lost that opportunity for now, since the urgency created by the debt crisis
has dissipated. We may have a future opportunity, however-thanks to our
failure the last time.
IV. CONCLUSION
Collusion is the most costly aspect of corruption because it undermines
competition, which is the lifeblood of economic growth and development.
Collusion is infectious, so a collaborative approach is bound to fail. On the flip
side, too heavy a hand will chill the countless transactions and interactions that
generate economic growth. Rather, we must use market-based incentives to fight
corruption, seeking to engender en environment of such demanding competition
that anyone who engages in collusion will not survive the ever-greater demands
for efficiency-or will be tattled on by jealous competitors. International
competition is particularly helpful in this regard. Trade and investment
liberalization, which clears the way for international competition, is the most
important of the three pillars of Gleneagles-style development policy. The other
two-foreign aid and debt relief-are not, by their nature competition-inducing.
They can be structured, however, to build competition, market-based incentives,
and a more informed market for good policymaking.
94. Kwang Wook Kim & J. Welby Leaman, The Debt of Nations: Rethinking Jubilee 2000,
REGENERATION QUARTERLY (Spring 2000).
